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NASA is advancing a new development approach and new technologies in the design, 
construction, and testing of the next great launch vehicle for space exploration. The ability to 
use these new tools is made possible by a learning culture able to embrace innovation, 
flexibility, and prudent risk tolerance, while retaining the hard-won lessons learned through 
the successes and failures of the past. This paper provides an overview of the Marshall Space 
Flight Center’s new approach to launch vehicle development, as well as examples of how 
that approach has been leveraged by NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Program to 
achieve its key goals of safety, affordability, and sustainability. 
 
Figure 1. NASA is learning from the past programs like Saturn and the Space Shuttle while applying new tools and 
management philosophy to develop the Space Launch System. 
I. Introduction 
ASA’s Space Launch System, or SLS, is becoming a reality, not just on computer design screens, but on 
factory floors, in test stands, and through thousands of skilled aerospace jobs across the nation. With it comes a 
new way of doing business that departs from the preceding Saturn and Space Shuttle programs (Figure 1). SLS will 
be the world’s most powerful rocket, opening a new era of exploration beyond Earth orbit for both astronauts and 
robotic science missions as discussed in NASA’s Strategic Plan.1 SLS will provide the world’s greatest payload 
mass and volume capability for missions to asteroids, the Moon, Mars, and the outer planets. So significant is its 
capability that payload designers will have the opportunity to trade mass and volume for other sought-after qualities 
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such as hardware and mission simplicity, technology development cost, and reduced trip times, depending on 
mission and architecture needs. 
 
 SLS is based on proven hardware from the Space Shuttle era and other exploration programs and cutting-edge 
tooling and manufacturing technology, significantly reducing development time and cost and making the vehicle 
more affordable to develop (Figure 2). The SLS core stage uses a liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen propulsion 
system, powered by four RS-25 engines that powered Shuttle missions to space. The SLS will also use a pair of 5-
segment solid boosters for its initial flights. This proven booster hardware, based on Shuttle and Constellation 
Program technology, is being modernized for this next-generation rocket, with upgrades to increase performance 
and fabrication improvements to decrease production time and cost.  
 As part of its affordability goal, SLS is designed to evolve with the nation’s exploration needs. The initial 
version will be capable of putting 70 metric tons (t) into low Earth orbit (LEO). Various evolutionary upgrades that 
could include upper stages, advanced boosters, and composite structures are envisioned for increasing its payload to 
130t. The 70t configuration will provide 10 percent more thrust at launch than the Saturn V rocket and carry more 
than three times the payload of the Shuttle. The 130-metric-ton configuration will stand taller than the Saturn V and 
provide 20 percent more thrust. 
 
 
Figure 2. Expanded view of major components of the 70t SLS configuration. 
 
 The first SLS mission – Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1) –  in Fiscal Year 2018, will launch an uncrewed Orion 
spacecraft to a stable point beyond the Moon and bring it back to Earth to demonstrate the integrated system 
performance of the SLS rocket and Orion spacecraft’s reentry and landing prior to a crewed flight. The second SLS 
mission, EM-2,  is targeted for Fiscal Year 2021 and will launch Orion with a crew of up to four astronauts farther 
into space than humans have ever ventured. The SLS will also send astronauts on NASA's first-ever mission to 
study an asteroid relocated to a stable orbit around the Moon by 2025. The mission provides experience in human 
spaceflight beyond low-Earth orbit, to test new systems and capabilities needed for a human mission to Mars in the 
proving ground around the Moon (cis-lunar space). Additional missions requiring SLS’ capabilities are under study, 
and potential partners such as the private Inspiration Mars organization requested SLS for its human mission to the 
Red Planet.
2 
 Fittingly for a program of this magnitude and significance, SLS is also employing a new management culture 
and new technologies to achieve its goals. Throughout its history, NASA has led change and adapted to it in 
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response to shifting missions, budgets, technology, and major events. Nonetheless, the Apollo Program and its 
design process set a standard for NASA’s development life cycle and systems engineering for decades.3 It was a 
touchstone, a source of national pride, and a blueprint for mission success for succeeding generations of engineers. 
But the Apollo Saturn V design cycle after 50-plus years of space transportation operations no longer directly 
applies to today’s programs existing in a different society with different technologies.  
 Though sometimes forgotten, the reality was that the 1960s Moon program was the beneficiary of Cold War 
politics, generous budgets, and a benign media environment that mitigated the impact of major failures, close calls, 
and a design process that allowed for early failures. Apollo’s successor, the Space Shuttle Program, had to operate 
with the greater expectations that came from Apollo’s success in a much more constrained budget climate with less 
political support. The Shuttle became a great achievement, advancing space technology, computer tools, and 
spaceflight operations over its 30-year lifespan. Despite the emergence of new computer-based analytical tools and 
the great experience base with traditional tools, risk margins turned into risk aversion and intolerance, not only 
within the Shuttle’s operational culture but also within other development programs during the Shuttle era. 
Decisions took too long. Processes, reviews, and working groups proliferated. Technical aspects were disconnected 
from cost and schedule. Subsystems were stovepiped. “Analysis paralysis” grew. Development schedules lagged. 
The Mars Climate Orbiter and Mars Polar Lander failures increased conservatism. “Failure is not an option” became 
failure to finish. Programs like X-33, X-34, Orbital Space Plane, and others were cancelled before they got to 
preliminary design review (PDR). 
 Today, NASA is pursuing a new path for human exploration beyond Earth orbit and a new design philosophy. 
SLS is key to that path. This super heavy lift capability can change the rules of exploration. But engineers face 
challenges unlike those of previous eras. Economic realities are even harsher. Affordability is paramount. 
International participation is a consideration.  Entrepreneurial space companies are now part of that path, bringing 
modern commercial processes and values. “Failure is not an option” means something different than it did during 
NASA’s Apollo 13 “successful failure.” 
 Facing enormous opportunity and enormous challenge, NASA is examining its culture of absolute perfection and 
extreme risk aversion to continue its historic mission of exploration and discovery. NASA Administrator Charles 
Bolden has turned two mishaps in the past year into opportunities to talk about the importance of taking risks. 
  “When you do stuff that nobody else has ever done, you have to be willing to accept risk,” he said in an email to 
employees after the failure of an experimental robotic lander.
4
 “Put another way, risk intolerance is a guarantee of 
failure to accomplish anything of significance. As we prepare to undertake the many challenges offered in the 
President’s 2014 budget for our agency, I ask you to continue to think about how we can identify and seize 
opportunities to make progress quickly and affordably, identify and manage risks, learn fast and adapt our plans to 
take the next steps.  While we do this, we must constantly balance our risks and rewards and always, always put the 
lives and safety of our people first.” 
 Again, after a spacewalk during which water began leaking into an astronaut’s spacesuit helmet, Bolden emailed 
employees, noting the importance of understanding or mitigating the causes of anomalies. 
 “Our work both in-house and with our industry and commercial partners should entail diligence in assessing risk 
and commitment to ensuring mission safety,” he said. “As the person ultimately responsible for all we do as the 
NASA family, I implore you to welcome risks, because that is how we push the boundaries of our achievement, but 
at the same time, I must emphasize in the strongest terms that we must not be complacent in our quest to ensure the 
safety of our crew members and teams on the ground.”* These statements were communicated across the leadership 
and workforce at NASA.  
 Today, enabled by a culture learning to embrace innovation and risk tolerance, the SLS team is using technology 
and evolving program management and systems engineering processes to appropriately alter the development life 
cycle, from design and analysis, through production, verification, logistics, and operations. New fabrication 
techniques, verification techniques, integrated analysis, and expanding computer aided design (CAD) technologies 
that follow the hardware from initial concept through operation are reducing the cost and time of bringing new 
hardware to the launch pad. Cultural changes and evolved systems engineering processes and policy are becoming 
more flexible, reversing a trend over the past 20 years and making it possible to take full advantage of new 
techniques and approaches. These cultural and technical changes, informed by historical experience, are finding 
their way into the SLS Program product development life cycle. The following sections will discuss some of those 
changes. 
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II. Cultural Change 
Evolving and accelerating the design cycle requires cultural change.  In pursuit of its affordability goals, SLS 
employed workforce alignment, integrated acquisition teams, facility consolidation, streamlined configuration 
management and requirements, and applied value stream mapping and industry best practices, in addition to 
further integrating traditional tools such as computer aided design. 
 The SLS team also took a look at the general condition. There is a greater understanding of the hardware life 
cycle and the appropriate balance points in that cycle for innovation and risk tolerance versus process and control as 
the program progresses from the drawing board to the launch pad (Figure 3). There’s a greater emphasis on finding 
solutions vs. policy compliance, the need to adjust to program/project size, the importance of integration and 
communication, and the focus on the product and people over the process. 
 
 
Figure 3. Development culture vs. operational culture. 
  
 After years of debating the intense level of insight and oversight into its programs, a hybrid development and 
acquisition model based on risk deliberately evolved during SLS formulation. The goal was to hit a balance between 
insight and oversight to be affordable and sustainable. The team sought to identify and resolve issues and establish 
clear requirements and simple lines of accountability early in the Program and employ existing and emerging 
technologies to reduce risk. The new model relies on government and industry best practices and lessons lived, 
balancing flexibility and innovation with appropriate discipline and rigor. Integration and simple interfaces between 
NASA and industry team members promotes effective communication. The Program reduced the number of 
deliverable documents required. SLS accepts formats and applications used by contractors in return for access to 
contractor systems. The number of Government specifications and standards has been reduced. Contractor and 
industry specifications and standards are accepted to the extent possible.  These and other adaptations by the SLS 
team have kept the Program on schedule and within budget. 
III. Technology Impacts on the Design Cycle 
 To thrive in the current economic climate, SLS employs creative engineering that retains the appropriate rigor 
and accepts appropriate flexibility. Designers now accept methods such as parametric analysis without extensive, 
expensive testing that affects budget and schedule, taking full advantage of experience and knowledge gained from 
heritage programs.  
 The way SLS employs new technology – often in combination with traditional technology – varies based on the 
size, complexity, allowable risk, cost, schedule, and other factors. Techniques pioneered on the Space Shuttle such 
as friction stir welding, are being used on the Core Stage to reduce costs and manufacturing time and increase 
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quality and reliability. Additive manufacturing techniques such as Selective Laser Melting (SLM) and Structured 
Light Scanning offer the opportunity to transform the design process, saving time and money (Figure 4). 
  
 
Figure 4. New technologies enable a compressed design cycle with greater risk tolerance. 
 
 SLM technology  – also known as 3D printing  – is being tested in uses such as the J-2X upper stage engine’s 
fuel turbopump maintenance port cover and an injector in a subscale RS-25 engine model (Figure 5). Such initial 
applications allow NASA to develop design standards, inspection techniques, material characteristics, etc., which 
will lead to the goal of using SLM-made parts on an operational human-rated liquid rocket engine.
.5
 
  SLM uses metal powder and a high-energy laser to melt it into a specific computer-generated pattern. The 
process produces parts with complex geometries that might otherwise require several parts and complex processing. 
Selected use in SLS has significantly reduced manufacturing time from months to weeks or even days. Single 
homogenous parts are structurally stronger and more stable than welded parts and result in an increased safety 
factor. 
 SLM can be used to fabricate heritage parts. Small modifications may be required but nothing that changes the 
fit, form, or function. The goal is to reduce parts count, welds, machining operation and, ultimately, time and 
money. 
 The Marshall Center’s initial experience with SLM of both new and heritage parts has been dramatic and 
promising. In several carefully selected applications, the cost savings ranges from 50 to 87 percent, with a time 
savings of 50 to 80 percent by reducing part count, welds, and machining operations.  
 Some of the heritage parts made to date include a J-2X gas generator duct and an RS-25 flex joint. The result 
was a 70 percent cost savings and a 50 percent time savings with the duct. The flex joint experience was equally 
dramatic, reducing parts count from 45 to 17, welds from more than 70 to 26 and machining operations from 147 to 
about 57.  On August 22, a subscale injector became the largest 3D part hotfire tested by NASA. This injector had 
only 2 parts, compared to a similar injector with 115.
6
 
 Using SLM to make new parts has proved an even more impressive demonstration of the potential, taking 
designs “from art to part” in hours, permitting design freedom, flexibility, and functionality versus manufacturing 
considerations. Production of a new turbopump inducer yielded a 50 percent cost savings and an 80 percent time 
savings.  
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Figure 5. 3D printed rocket engine injector, left, and maintenance/turbopump exhaust port cover for J-2X, inset and 
position on engine, right. 
 
Applying these new “art-to-part” 3D modeling technologies in large scale hardware is enabling more integrated 
design, better fabrication techniques, and better integration of systems and components. In small scale hardware, 
these technologies permit the development of prototypes, parallel analysis and testing, testing of multiple designs, 
and proceeding beyond the development phase at significantly lower risk. 
Likewise, structured light scanning (Figure 6) has allowed SLS to improve process development, reduce cost 
and schedule through digital assembly, compare small changes in hardware not previously possible, refine 
performance predictions, reverse-engineer heritage parts, and examine subtle details.  
By projecting a pattern of light on a subject and looking at the deformation of the pattern, structured light 
scanners provide speed and precision, generating profiles that are exponentially more precise than laser 
triangulation. SLS is using the technology to greatly reduce inspection time and gain greater data than traditional 
means. It has been used to produce 3D computer-aided design drawings of the Saturn F-1 engine gas generator. 
Marshall has developed and expanded visual mapping technology to create a “4D” process that removes the 
intermediate computer translation step. Structured light 3D and 4D will be used more often in the future for 
inspection, manufacturing, and testing. The 4D mapping technology will be able to provide geometry comparisons, 
fluid/flow, thermal, stress, and work instruction directly onto hardware through a projection morphing process. This 
will enable engineers to make real-time decisions on the shop floor and test stand, preventing costly rework and 
reducing the cost of processing fabrication discrepancies. 
This technology is particularly valuable in the late stages of complex systems integration of large elements with 
large numbers of people involved. SLS potentially saved weeks during J-2X development using structured light to 
refine the interface between the engine and test stand fixtures. 
 
  
Figure 6. Scanning a part, left, and out-of-round J-2X nozzle extension with data projected onto part. 
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Using technologies to be more efficient, reliable, and affordable required the Program bring them to a level 
deemed safe for NASA systems, maintain appropriate rigor in testing and acceptance, and transition new 
technology. Maximizing these technologies also requires cultural acceptance and understanding and balancing 
standards with creativity. Evolved systems engineering processes at NASA are increasingly more flexible than they 
have been in the past, enabling the implementation of new techniques and approaches.  
IV. Other Technologies and Tools 
SLS has used a variety of other improved design, modeling, and simulation tools to accumulate confidence and 
materially streamline development. 
Shell Buckling Knockdown Factor
 
testing (Figure 7) reduced risk and increased margin by 5,000 pounds on the 
Core Stage. NASA’s databases were Apollo-vintage and had not kept pace with modern materials and 
manufacturing. Employing photogrammetry, a barrel section of a Shuttle External Tank was outfitted with 70,000 
black and white dots and subjected to launch loads while monitored by 20 cameras and 800 sensors. The results 
affected structural safety factors that have existed for decades and offer the potential to reduce launch vehicle weight 
by 20 percent.
7 
This technique allows a much more global behavior characterization than traditional strain gauge 
instrumentation. But when the two are combined, the result is greater accuracy and calibration of physics-based 
math models. 
 
  
Figure 7. Shuttle external tank section covered with imaging targets for shell buckling tests at Marshall, left, and 
finite element model of buckled shell, right. 
 
SLS delivered delivering high-fidelity emulators to Orion and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) to support 
parallel multi-Program avionics and software integration and test activities that minimize the exchange of Program 
avionics hardware for a cost savings of $15-20 million. SLS and EGS are establishing network interface facilities to 
support remote, real-time integration and test to avoid duplication of capabilities and minimize travel costs expected 
to save $5-7 million. 
SLS used both traditional and modern methods to test vehicle aerodynamics and control (Figure 8). The team 
conducted more than 4,000 runs in the Transonic Dynamics (Langley Research Center), Trisonic (MSFC), Polysonic 
(Boeing), and Unitary Plan (Ames Research Center) wind tunnels. Testing included liftoff transition data with four 
different payload configurations to improve the design and stability, examine buffet and aero loads, and ensure 
vehicle control at low speeds. The results will be used to run flight simulations on the vehicle to assess its 
performance.
8 
The Program used a new technique to add performance and robustness to SLS flight software. For the first time 
in a launch vehicle, the SLS team developed an adaptive control concept, adding the ability for an autonomous flight 
computer system to retune itself in flight. The system, called the Adaptive Augmenting Controller, learns and 
responds to unexpected differences in the actual flight versus preflight predictions. This ability to react to unknown 
scenarios that might occur during flight and make real-time adjustments to the autopilot system provides system 
performance and flexibility, as well as increased safety for the crew. Armstrong Flight Research Center’s F/A-18 
aircraft was used for the five-flight series. More than a dozen tests simulating abnormal conditions such as wind 
gusts or higher thrust were conducted on each flight.
9
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Figure 8. Wind tunnel testing at Ames Research Center, left, and Armstrong Flight Research Center, right. 
 
SLS hardware, software, and operating systems were brought together in 2014 in the System Integration Test 
Facility to fly SLS virtually the way it will fly in reality (Figure 9). Avionics hardware was arranged in an 
instrument ring flight configuration, including the most powerful computer processor every used on a flight system. 
Tests will tell designers how the vehicle will perform from the launch pad to space under a variety of conditions.
10 
 
  
Figure 9. Boeing workers install SLS avionics, left. A test engineer runs flight simulation, right. 
V.  Program Benefits 
There are numerous indications that new tools and new rules/acceptance for using them are taking hold and 
changing the design process. SLS benefits from a streamlined organization with more than 50 percent reduction in 
civil service workforce and more than 30 percent in non-prime contractors compared to the Constellation Program. 
This enabled a quicker start and flexibility not available under traditional contract methods. Breaking with recent 
history of large prime System Engineering & Integration (SE&I) contracts, SLS performs that function in-house at 
Marshall using a streamlined organizational structure focused on communication, integration and accountability. 
Combined with fewer governance boards, the result is increased decisional velocity and earlier identification and 
resolution of issues. The SE&I team worked numerous actions in 2013 to understand vehicle performance, work out 
interface issues between vehicle elements, coordinate overall vehicle design issues, and complete other tasks critical 
to supporting streamlined development. 
A significant amount of highly detailed vehicle-level analyses were conducted to ensure that preliminary design 
met requirements. Integrated vehicle design tools were used to assess the health of the vehicle against requirements. 
Each major assembly used value stream mapping and producability analysis, making sure design and manufacturing 
were in sync for tooling interfaces. 
SLS booster manufacturer ATK used value stream mapping to achieve a 46 percent reduction in manufacturing 
and assembly time. The company also implemented new non-destructive evaluation techniques. Teams identified 
more than 300 changes and eliminated more than 400 hardware moves. Similar efforts by Aerojet Rocketdyne are 
targeting RS-25 production cost reductions of up to 30 percent on powerhead and nozzle components. Also within 
the Liquid Engines project, systems engineering and affordability thinking led to development of a common engine 
controller that will work for several engines, reducing hardware development and cost.  
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In the Core Stage effort, the Program’s only new development component, manufacturing tooling was in place at 
Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF)
11
 and producing full-size test hardware (Figure 10). 
 
  
Figure 10. Core Stage barrel segment, left and dome segment, right, at Michoud Assembly Facility. 
 
The J-2X Upper Stage Engine borrowed its operating cycle and flow schematic from the Apollo-heritage J-2 
engine but was otherwise virtually a new propulsion system with improved power level and performance. Yet it 
reached 100 percent power level on the test stand in just 29 days compared to 651 days for the J-2. While the 
government/industry team’s decades of experience deserves recognition, the ability to integrate modern design, 
analysis, and test practices contributed to the success of the Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DT&E) 
effort. With completion of the J-2X test series, the government/industry team is transferring its experience to the 
core stage engine project. 
Using improved models and tools developed since the Shuttle, SLS has decided to conduct integrated systems 
test (green run) of the first core stage flight article rather than building a separate main propulsion test article 
(MPTA), saving hundreds of millions of dollars.   
Such efforts to adopt new technologies and practices have had a significant cumulative effect. SLS reached 
System Requirements Review/Systems Design Review milestones in only 10 months from Program announcement 
and Preliminary Design Review less than 2 years from the SLS architecture announcement in 2011.
12
 SLS is now 
more than halfway through design and development. Element Critical Design Reviews (CDR) are ongoing 
throughout 2014, with the vehicle CDR scheduled for 2015. Notably, in the current economic climate, SLS is on 
schedule and within budget to deliver the most capable launch vehicle in history for launch availability in FY 2018. 
Again, there are many reasons for that success, but the new tools and the SLS team’s ability to use them played a 
significant role. 
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Figure 11. Milestones in the SLS development path, on track to support launch in FY2018. 
VI. Conclusion 
Over the years, NASA has evolved slowly from an Apollo-era design cycle, knowledge, experience, technology, 
and external factors rapidly changed around it. Experience now suggests that there is another way. In addition to 
lessons learned, the SLS team has an increasingly sophisticated set of testing, tools, and techniques for reducing risk. 
New technologies are changing the way NASA does business, including the design process. Developing new 
technology and pushing its limits is essential to achieving Agency and SLS programmatic goals while reflecting the 
key tenants of safety, affordability, and sustainability. NASA engineers increasingly understand that development 
requires a different approach than operations. In development, engineers need to be more innovative, flexible, and 
risk tolerant. In operations, the launch vehicle professionals can afford to be more aligned with process and control. 
With new technologies and a new mindset, SLS is launching not only a new era of spaceflight but a new era of 
design and development as well (Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12. Boosters separate as SLS heads for orbit. 
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